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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a dynamic model of mismatch. Workers and jobs are randomly assigned to labor
markets. Each labor market clears at each instant but some labor markets have more workers than
jobs, hence unemployment, and some have more jobs than workers, hence vacancies. As workers
and jobs move between labor markets, some unemployed workers find vacant jobs and some
employed workers lose or leave their job and become unemployed. The model is quantitatively
consistent with the comovement of unemployment, job vacancies, and the rate at which unemployed
workers find jobs over the business cycle. It can also address a variety of labor market phenomena,
including duration dependence in the job finding probability and employer-to-employer transitions,








Why do unemployed workers and job vacancies coexist? What determines the rate at which
unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs? This paper advances the proposition that at any point in time,
the skills and geographical location of unemployed workers are poorly matched with the skill
requirements and location of job openings. The rate at which unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs
depends on the rate at which they retrain or move to locations with available jobs, the rate at
which jobs open in locations with available workers, and the rate at which employed workers
vacate jobs in locations with suitable unemployed workers.
My main ﬁnding is that such a model of mismatch is quantitatively consistent with
two robust features of labor markets: the negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies at business cycle frequencies (the Beveridge curve) and the positive correlation
between the rate at which unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs and the vacancy-unemployment
(v-u) ratio (the reduced-form matching function). The model-generated Beveridge curve has
a slope of approximately −1, quantitatively consistent with evidence from the United States.
The model predicts that a ten percent increase in the v-u ratio should be associated with
a two percent increase in the job ﬁnding rate. In particular, the elasticity of the model-
generated reduced-form matching function is virtually constant. Empirically the elasticity
is constant but closer to 0.3. I also use the model to explore employment-to-unemployment
and job-to-job transitions and duration dependence in the job ﬁnding rate.
The view of unemployment and vacancies that I advance in this paper is conceptually
distinct from the one that search theory has advocated since the pioneering work of McCall
(1970), Mortensen (1970), and Lucas and Prescott (1974). According to search theory, un-
employed workers have left their old job and are actively searching for a new employer. In
contrast, this paper emphasizes that unemployed workers are attached to an occupation and
a geographic location in which jobs are currently scarce. Mismatch is a theory of former
steel workers remaining near a closed plant in the hope that it reopens. Search, particularly
as articulated in Lucas and Prescott (1974),1 is a theory of former steel workers moving to
a new city to look for positions as nurses. These two theories are complementary and it is
a priori reasonable to think that mismatch may be as important as search in understanding
equilibrium unemployment.
Indeed, the mismatch view of unemployment and vacancies is not new.2 Tobin (1972, p.
9) advances a theory of a “stochastic macro-equilibrium” in which “excess supplies in labor
1A potential drawback to Lucas and Prescott (1974) is that they do not have a notion of job vacancies;
however, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) have introduced vacancies into a monetary search model based on
the Lucas-Prescott framework.
2Padoa-Schioppa (1991) argues that there are four distinct meanings to the term mismatch. The notion
of mismatch in this paper is closest to the second approach that he discusses.
1markets take the form of unemployment, and excess demands the form of unﬁlled vacancies.
At any moment, markets vary widely in excess demand or supply, and the economy as a
whole shows both vacancies and unemployment.”3 Dr` eze and Bean (1990) discuss important
subsequent developments, including conditions on the joint distribution of workers and jobs
across labor markets which ensure that the aggregation of many small markets yields a
constant elasticity of substitution Beveridge curve. But both of these papers link mismatch
with disequilibrium, where the wage does not clear each labor market. This paper shows that
a mismatch model is quantitatively consistent with macro-labor facts even in an environment
where the welfare theorems hold. Section 2 discusses other related papers.
Section 3 develops a dynamic stochastic model of mismatch. There are many local labor
markets, each of which represents a particular geographic location and a particular occupa-
tion. The wage clears each market at each instant, but there may be unemployed workers in
one market and job vacancies in another. Workers and jobs randomly enter and exit markets,
causing unemployed workers to ﬁnd jobs and employed workers to lose jobs, sometimes mov-
ing directly to another job. There is one key economic decision, ﬁrms’ option to create more
jobs. I prove that the equilibrium is unique and maximizes the present discounted value of
output net of job creation costs given the constraints imposed by market segmentation.
Section 4 considers the impact of aggregate productivity shocks on unemployment and
vacancies. An increase in aggregate productivity induces ﬁrms to create more jobs, which
raises the vacancy rate and reduces the unemployment rate, moving the economy along a
downward-sloping Beveridge curve. I compare the theoretical relationship with evidence
from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) and show that the theoretical
and empirical Beveridge curves are nearly indistinguishable. Moreover, ﬂuctuations in many
other variables, including the turnover rate of jobs, induce movements along a downward
sloping Beveridge curve in the mismatch model. In contrast, in Pissarides’s (1985) matching
model, ﬂuctuations in the turnover rate induce a counterfactual positive co-movement of
unemployment and vacancies (Abraham and Katz, 1986; Shimer, 2005a).
Section 5 performs comparative statics with respect to aggregate productivity. I ﬁnd that
the v-u ratio responds more than 4 times as much to productivity shocks in the mismatch
model as in the matching model. Shimer (2005a) argues that the matching model only
explains about ten percent of the volatility in vacancies and unemployment, so this helps to
reconcile the theory and the data. I also examine the source of this additional volatility.
I then turn to the comparative static relationship between the rate at which unemployed
workers ﬁnd jobs and the v-u ratio. Not only is the reduced-form matching function in-
3Tobin (1972) cites a number of previous authors in developing these ideas including Lipsey (1960) and
Holt (1970). Hansen (1970) proposes a similar model of mismatch.
2creasing in the model, it is nearly indistinguishable from a Cobb-Douglas. An increase in
productivity that raises the v-u ratio by 10 percent raises the job ﬁnding rate by about
2 percent. This is roughly consistent with U.S. data, where it is impossible to reject the
hypothesis of a constant elasticity, although the elasticity is closer to 0.3. This last fact is
usually interpreted by search theorists as evidence in favor of a Cobb-Douglas matching func-
tion (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001); this paper provides the ﬁrst structural explanation
for why the matching function appears to be Cobb-Douglas.
The comparative statics also show that higher productivity is associated with a lower
separation rate into unemployment and a higher job-to-job transition rate, even though the
total separation rate is acyclic. Conditional on an employment relationship ending, a worker
is more likely to be able to switch employers immediately when jobs are more plentiful.
Section 6 calibrates the model parameters to match some steady state facts from the U.S.
and then simulates the impact of aggregate productivity shocks. The simulations conﬁrm
the comparative statics. The mismatch model explains more than a quarter of the volatility
in the job ﬁnding rate, more than a third of the volatility in the v-u ratio, and almost half
the volatility in the separation rate in response to small productivity shocks. It is consistent
with evidence on the Beveridge curve and reduced-form matching function
A careful examination of the job ﬁnding rate requires me to account for heterogeneity
in the exit rate from unemployment, which I do in Section 7. The long-term unemployed
are typically located in labor markets where jobs are particularly scarce, which makes their
prospects for exiting unemployment unusually bleak. This dynamic sorting explains much
of the empirical duration dependence in the job ﬁnding rate. The remainder presumably
reﬂects unmodeled worker heterogeneity. I also ﬁnd that accounting for duration dependence
lowers the measured level of the job ﬁnding rate and slightly lowers the elasticity of the
reduced-form matching function.
Section 8 takes a step towards relaxing the paper’s strongest assumption, that all workers
and jobs are equally likely to move. I introduce a parameter δ and assume that a worker
never enters a labor market with more than δ excess workers and never exits one with more
than δ excess jobs. Similarly ﬁrms never create jobs in a labor market with more than δ
excess jobs and never destroy jobs in a market with more than δ excess workers. I ﬁnd
that my characterization of the Beveridge curve and the reduced-form matching function are
qualitatively robust to any positive value of δ, although the quantitative ﬁt of the model is
slightly better when δ is large.
I conclude in Section 9.
32 Related Literature
2.1 Mismatch Models
A number of previous authors have developed formal models of mismatch as a source of un-
employment. Many use an urn-ball structure, where workers (balls) are randomly assigned
to jobs (urns); see Butters (1977) and Hall (1977) for early examples. The random assign-
ment ensures that some jobs are unﬁlled, yielding vacancies, and some jobs are assigned
multiple workers, only one of whom can be hired, yielding unemployment. Hall (2000) sup-
poses that workers are randomly assigned to locations and then matched in pairs. One
worker is necessarily unemployed in any location with an odd number of workers, linking the
importance of matching (the number of workers per location) and the unemployment rate.
Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) oﬀer an alternative model of matching frictions based
on workers and ﬁrms searching in diﬀerent “channels;” however, they simply assume that the
number of channels is a constant elasticity function of unemployment and vacancies.
Stock-ﬂow matching models oﬀer another sensible theory of mismatch (Taylor, 1995;
Coles and Muthoo, 1998; Coles and Smith, 1998; Coles and Petrongolo, 2003). According to
these models, only a small proportion of worker-job matches are feasible. When a worker
loses her job, she looks among the available stock of vacancies to see if her skills are suitable
for any of them. If so, she is immediately paired with a suitable vacancy, while otherwise she
remains unemployed. Symmetrically, entering job vacancies search for a match within the
stock of unemployed workers.
Perhaps the most similar models of mismatch are Lagos’s (2000) model of the taxicab
market and Sattinger’s (2005) model of queuing. According to Lagos (2000), there are
a ﬁxed set of locations and two types of economic agents, drivers and passengers. The
short side of the market is served within each location and drivers optimally relocate to
the best possible location. Nevertheless, Lagos ﬁnds that empty taxis and unserved riders
can coexist in equilibrium if prices are ﬁxed exogenously, yielding an aggregate Beveridge
curve. Sattinger (2005) assumes workers are randomly assigned to job queues and wait to
be “served.” A worker on a long queue experiences a longer unemployment spell. He shows
that a combination of queuing and search is consistent with a downward sloping Beveridge
curve. To generate mismatch, one must take one of the approaches adopted in these papers,
either prices that do not clear markets or limited mobility of workers and jobs.
There are many small diﬀerences between these earlier approaches to mismatch and the
model that I propose in this paper. For example, by making the notion of a labor market
explicit, it is sensible to think about wages being determined by competition for labor within
markets. The literature on urn-ball and stock-ﬂow matching models has typically assumed
4that wages are either posted by ﬁrms as a recruiting device or bargained ex post by workers
and ﬁrms. But the most important diﬀerence between this paper and the urn-ball and stock-
ﬂow literatures is one of emphasis. No previous paper has shown that a mismatch model is
quantitatively consistent with the empirical comovement of unemployment, vacancies, and
the job ﬁnding rate. Instead, the literature has focused on the theoretical shortcomings of the
reduced-form matching function approach by arguing that mismatch models do not deliver a
structural matching function. Indeed, this seems to be merely a matter of emphasis. In some
preliminary work, I have found that the quantitative behavior of the model in this paper
almost indistinguishable from a stock-ﬂow matching model (Shimer, 2006).
2.2 Search and Matching Models
The issues this paper examines have traditionally been the realm of search models, es-
pecially Pissarides’s (1985) matching model and its variants. Under appropriate restric-
tions on the reduced-form matching function and on the nature of shocks, the matching
model is quantitatively capable of describing the Beveridge curve (Abraham and Katz, 1986;
Blanchard and Diamond, 1989) and the relationship between the v-u ratio and the rate at
which unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs (Pissarides, 1986; Blanchard and Diamond, 1989).
Despite these successes, the matching model has two signiﬁcant shortcomings. The ﬁrst
is the matching function itself. It is intended to represent “heterogeneities, frictions, and
information imperfections” and to capture “the implications of the costly trading process
without the need to make the heterogeneities and other features that give rise to it explicit”
(Pissarides, 2000, pp. 3–4). But Lagos (2000) emphasizes that if the matching function is a
reduced-form relationship, one should be concerned about whether it is invariant to policy
changes. Addressing this issue requires an explicit model of heterogeneity that gives rise to
an empirically successful reduced-form matching function.
The second is wage determination. In the matching model, workers and ﬁrms are typically
in a bilateral monopoly situation, and so competitive theories of wage determination are
inapplicable. Wages are instead set via bargaining. Some recent research has emphasized
that the details of the bargaining protocol are quantitatively critical to the ability of the model
to replicate business cycle ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies (Shimer, 2005a; Hall,
2005; Hall and Milgrom, 2005). The model I develop in this paper circumvents both of these
issues. There is no matching function and wages are set competitively.
53 A Model of Mismatch
3.1 Economic Agents
There are a M workers and a large number of ﬁrms. All agents are risk-neutral, inﬁnitely-
lived, and discount future income at rate r. Time is continuous.
3.2 Stocks
I start by looking at the state of the economy at any moment in time t. Section 3.3 describes
the ﬂow of workers and jobs and shows that this is consistent with the stocks described here.
At any point in time, each worker is assigned to one of L labor markets. These assignments
are independent across workers, so the distribution of workers across labor markets is a
multinomial random variable. Each ﬁrm may have zero, one, or more jobs. Let N(t) denote
the total number of jobs; later this will be determined endogenously. Each job is assigned
to one labor market. Again, these assignments are independent across jobs and independent
of the number of workers assigned to the labor market. Thus the distribution of jobs across
labor markets is an independent multinomial random variable.
Let M ≡ M/L and N(t) ≡ N(t)/L. In the remainder of this paper, I focus on the limit as
L → ∞ with M > 0 an exogenous parameter and N(t) ≥ 0 an endogenous variable. In this
limit, the number of workers and jobs in a labor market are independent Poisson random
variables. In a standard abuse of the law of large numbers, I assume that the fraction of





if (i,j) ∈ {0,1,2,...}2 and π(i,j;N(t)) = 0 otherwise. To conserve on notation, I suppress
the dependence of π on the parameter M.
The cross-sectional distribution of workers and jobs is critical for what follows. It will








Proof. The results follow directly from diﬀerentiating π in equation (1).
Workers and jobs must match in pairs in order to produce market output. One worker and
one job in the same labor market can jointly produce p(t) units of the numeraire homogeneous
consumption good. A single worker (an unemployed worker) produces z < p(t) units of the
same good at home, while a single job (a vacancy) produces nothing. Workers and jobs are
indivisible. These stark assumptions give a concrete notion of unemployment and vacancies.
6There is perfect competition within each labor market so unemployed workers and vacant
jobs cannot coexist in the same market. Let i denote the number of workers in some labor
market and j denote the number of jobs. If i > j, i − j workers are unemployed but all
workers are indiﬀerent about being unemployed; the wage is driven down to the value of
home production, z. If i < j, j − i jobs are vacant but all ﬁrms are indiﬀerent about their
jobs being vacant; the wage is driven up to the marginal product of labor, p(t). If i = j,
there is neither unemployment nor vacancies in the market and the wage is not determined.
I assume that if i = j, the wage is equal to workers’ reservation wage, z. The quantitative
results are scarcely aﬀected if I instead assume the wage is p(t) when i = j.
The number of unemployed workers per labor market is equal to the diﬀerence between
the number of workers i and the number of jobs j, summed across labor markets with more











(j − i)π(i,j;N). (2)
The v-u ratio is V (N)/U(N) and the unemployment and vacancy rates are
u(N) ≡ U(N)/M and v(N) ≡ V (N)/N. (3)







I again suppress these variables’ dependence on the parameter M.
Perfect competition within labor markets is a stark assumption and implies that wages
only taking on two possible values at any point in time. However, the movement of workers
and jobs across markets, which I discuss next, ensures that the expected present value of wages
diﬀers continuously across markets depending on the current value of i and j. If workers and
ﬁrms can commit to long-term contracts, wage payments may be much smoother than is
suggested by this spot-market model of wages.
3.3 Flows
Each worker’s human capital is shocked according to a Poisson process with arrival rate q.
The arrival of this shock is exogenous, independent of the worker’s current employment status
or wage. When the “quit” shock hits, the worker must leave her labor market and move to
7a random new one, independent of conditions in the new labor market. This means that the
arrival rate of workers into a labor market is qM. This random inﬂow and outﬂow of workers
implies a Poisson distribution of workers across labor market at each instant.
Symmetrically, each job is destroyed according to a Poisson process with arrival rate l.
When this “layoﬀ” shock occurs, the job leaves the labor market and disappears. Conversely,
a ﬁrm may create a new job by paying a ﬁxed cost k > 0. When it does so, the job is randomly
assigned to a labor market. Again, both the entry and exit of jobs is independent of conditions
in the local labor market, although the decision to create a job depends on aggregate labor
market conditions.
I assume a pair remains matched until either a quit or layoﬀ hits the match, at rate q+l,
consistent with a small unmodeled turnover cost.
3.4 Aggregate Shock
I focus on a single type of aggregate shock, ﬂuctuations in aggregate productivity p(t), but
indicate throughout the paper where the results extend to ﬂuctuations in other parameters.
Assume p(t) = py(t) = ey(t) + (1 − ey(t))(z + (r + l)k), where y(t) is a jump variable lying on
a discrete grid:
y ∈ Y ≡ {−ν∆,−(ν − 1)∆,...,0,...,(ν − 1)∆,ν∆}.
∆ > 0 is the step size and 2ν +1 ≥ 3 is the number of grid points. A shock hits y according























Note that although the step size is constant, the probability that y′ = y +∆ is smaller when
y is larger, falling from 1 at y = −ν∆ to 0 at y = ν∆. Shimer (2005a) shows that one can
represent the stochastic process for y as
dy = −γydt + σdx,
where γ ≡ λ/ν measures the speed of mean reversion and σ ≡
√
λ∆ is the instantaneous stan-
dard deviation. This is similar to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, except that the innovations
in y are not Gaussian, since y is constrained to lie on a discrete grid.4
4Suppose one changes the three parameters of the stochastic process, the step size, arrival rate of shocks,








for any ε > 0. This does not change either γ or σ, but
8Note that by construction py > z + (r + l)k, so output exceeds the sum of the value
of leisure and the “user cost of capital,” the price of capital multiplied by the sum of the
interest and depreciation rates. This ensures that the economy never shuts down. To save
on notation, let EpXp′ denote the expected value of an arbitrary state-contingent variable X
following the next aggregate shock, conditional on the current state p.
3.5 Equilibrium
Firms create jobs whenever doing so is proﬁtable. Let Jp(N) denote the expected value of a
job when productivity is p and there are N jobs in the average market. If the sample paths
of N were diﬀerentiable, we could express this using a standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation:
rJp(N) = (p − z)S(N) − lJp(N) + J
′
p(N) ˙ N + λ(EpJp′(N) − Jp(N)). (5)
The left hand side is the ﬂow value of a job. The current payoﬀ is the diﬀerence between
output and home production income multiplied by the probability that the job is in a market
without vacancies.5 If the job is located in a market with vacancies, either it is vacant and
produces nothing or it is ﬁlled and pays a wage equal to labor productivity and so again
yields no proﬁt. The second term on the right hand side accounts for the chance the job
exits. The ﬁnal two terms deal with aggregate changes. The number of jobs increases at rate
˙ N and the shock can change productivity from p to p′ at any time.
Free entry implies that no new jobs are created, ˙ N = −lN, whenever Jp(N) is smaller
than the cost of creating a job k. Conversely, if ever Jp(N) exceeded k, the number of jobs
would jump up instantaneously until the point where Jp(N) is driven down to k; for this
reason, the sample paths of N are typically not continuous. The process stops because an
increase in N reduces the share of markets with excess workers, S(N), which in turn reduces
the expected value of a job. This ensures that Jp(N) ≤ k for all p and N.
To be precise, the equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of targets N∗
p. If N(t) < N∗
p,
ﬁrms instantaneously create N∗
p −N(t) jobs. If N(t) = N∗
p, gross job creation and destruction
are equal. If N(t) > N∗
p, no jobs are created. We can write the HJB equation (5) as
rJp(N) =
(
(p − z)S(N) − lJp(N) − J′
p(N)lN + λ(EpJp′(N) − Jp(N)) if N ≥ N∗
p
rk if N < N∗
p
(6)
as ε → 0, y converges to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
5Knowing my job is located in a particular market, the probability there are i workers and j jobs in that
market is π(i,j − 1;N). For this reason, the relevant probability is S(N), the share of markets with j < i.
9In addition, evaluating the evaluating the HJB at N = N∗
p, where ˙ N = 0, gives value
matching and smooth pasting conditions,
Jp(N
∗




p) = 0. (7)
This is a standard irreversible investment problem (see, for example , Pindyck, 1988), which
yields the following characterization of equilibrium:
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium. In it, the targets N∗
p are increasing.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proof is constructive and so also provides a computational algorithm for N∗
p.
3.6 Social Planner’s Solution
We can alternatively imagine a social planner who decides on gross job creation in order to
maximize the presented discounted value of output net of job creation costs. A version of
the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems holds in this model:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium maximizes the present value of net output.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, there is only one margin to get correct in this economy, the amount of entry.
A job is valuable whenever it employs a worker who would otherwise be unemployed, i.e.
whenever it is located in a market without vacancies. In this event, the job needs to recoup
its full marginal product. Otherwise it should get nothing. Competition in the labor market
ensures this happens. Note that the tie-breaking assumption that the wage is equal to z
when the number of workers and jobs are equal is important for this result.
3.7 Discussion
This model is deliberately parsimonious. The only economic decision is one by ﬁrms, which
must decide at each instant whether to create new jobs.6 In particular, the movement between
labor markets is exogenous and random. While the reader may be accustomed to models in
which mobility is endogenous, there are advantages to the approach I adopt here.
On a theoretical level, it introduces relatively few free parameters and stresses that
the main results are a consequence of limited mobility and aggregation. There is also
6This is also the only economic decision in Chapter 1 of Pissarides (2000) and in Shimer (2005a).
10evidence that mobility at business cycle frequencies is primarily for idiosyncratic reasons.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) show that gross occupational mobility is 10 to 15 percent
per year at the one digit level while net mobility is only 1 to 3 percent. Blanchard and Katz
(1992) argue that for 5 to 7 years after an adverse shock to regional employment, the impact
is primarily on local unemployment rather than on net migration.
In addition, there are substantial unmodeled costs to switching occupations or moving to
a new location. Kennan and Walker (2006) estimate that the cost for a 20-year-old of moving
to a random state is $274,000, in 2005 dollars. This reﬂects the fact that in their data set,
relative wages have little impact on migration decisions. In the numerical work that follows,
no worker could increase her lifetime income by more than 5 percent if she moved to a random
new location. If mobility is endogenous but mobility costs, including retraining costs, the loss
of human capital, etc., exceed this amount, the analysis in this paper is applicable. Finally,
I evaluate the robustness of my results to alternate mobility assumptions in Section 8.
4 The Beveridge Curve
This section evaluates the ability of the model to explain the comovement of unemployment
and vacancies, the Beveridge curve.
4.1 Theory
Recall from equation (3) that the unemployment and vacancy rates depend only on the
exogenous number of workers per market M and the endogenous number of jobs per market
N. Productivity shocks therefore aﬀect unemployment and vacancies through their impact
on the number of jobs per market. The following proposition shows how:
Proposition 3 The unemployment rate u is increasing in the number of workers per labor










































Proof. See Appendix A.
11This has a number of implications. First, productivity shocks cause movements along a
downward-sloping v-u locus. Higher productivity raises the number of jobs per labor market
N and thus reduces the unemployment rate and raises the vacancy rate.
Second, a proportional increase in both M and N reduces both the unemployment and
vacancy rates.7 Doubling M and N is equivalent to merging randomly selected pairs of labor
markets. If both markets have unemployment, this merger does not aﬀect the unemployment
or vacancy rates, and similarly if both markets have vacancies. But merging a market with
unemployment and a market with vacancies reduces the unemployment and vacancy rate
in both. This comparative static suggests that the mismatch construction may be useful in
other markets where the coexistence of unemployment and vacancies is more or less common.
If matching is a more severe problem, as might be the case in marriage or housing markets,
M and N should be modeled as relatively small numbers. If it is a less severe problem, as in
commodity markets, M and N may be thought of as very large numbers.
Finally, Proposition 3 implies that data on the unemployment and vacancy rates pin down
the number of workers and jobs per labor market:
Proposition 4 For any u ∈ (0,1) and v ∈ (0,1), there is a unique M ∈ (0,∞) and N ∈
(0,∞) solving equation (3).
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.2 Measurement
Since December 2000, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has measured job vacancies
using the JOLTS. This is the most reliable time series for vacancies in the U.S.. According
to the BLS, “A job opening requires that 1) a speciﬁc position exists, 2) work could start
within 30 days, and 3) the employer is actively recruiting from outside of the establishment
to ﬁll the position. Included are full-time, part-time, permanent, temporary, and short-term
openings. Active recruiting means that the establishment is engaged in current eﬀorts to ﬁll
the opening, such as advertising in newspapers or on the Internet, posting help-wanted signs,
accepting applications, or using similar methods.”8 I measure the vacancy rate as the ratio
of vacancies to vacancies plus employment.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) to mea-
sure the unemployment rate each month. The CPS measures employment and unemployment
using a household questionnaire designed to determine whether an individual is working or,
7A proportional increase in M and N raises u by ∂u
∂ log M + ∂u
∂ log N = − N
M
P∞
i=1 π(i,i − 1) times the
percentage change in M and N, and similarly for v.












































































Figure 1: The brown dots show U.S. monthly data from December 2000 to April 2006. The
unemployment rate is measured by the BLS from the CPS. The vacancy rate is measured by
the BLS from the JOLTS. The solid blue line shows the model-generated Beveridge curve
with M = 244.2 and N ∈ [233,243].
if she is not working, available for and actively seeking work. The ratio of unemployment
to the sum of unemployment and employment is the unemployment rate. The brown dots
in Figure 1 show the strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies over
this time period, the empirical Beveridge curve.
From December 2000 to April 2006, the unemployment and vacancy rates averaged 5.4
percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. Using Proposition 4, these two numbers uniquely
determine M = 244.2 and N = 236.3.9 Productivity shocks aﬀect the unemployment and
vacancy rates by changing the number of jobs per market. As N varies between 233 and 243,
the unemployment and vacancy rates in equation (3) trace out the blue line in Figure 1. The
ﬁt of the model to the data is remarkable.
A shortcoming of JOLTS is that it only covers one recession and subsequent expansion.
Moreover, the recovery was unusual in that employment growth proceeded much slower
than normal. While unfortunately no ideal measure of job vacancies exists over a longer
time period, the Conference Board Help Wanted Index provides a crude one since 1951 (see
9To get a sense of whether these magnitudes are reasonable, observe that there are about 134 million
workers in the U.S. according to the Current Employment Statistics (CES). Dividing by 244.2 gives about
550,000 labor markets. The Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) counts about 800 occupations,
while there are 362 metropolitan statistical areas (regions with at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or
more inhabitants) and 560 micropolitan statistical areas (regions with an urban area of 10,000 to 50,000
inhabitants). Together this gives a total of about 740,000 occupations and geographic areas. Although the
sharp theoretical distinction between labor markets is less obvious in the data, this back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that 244.2 workers per labor market is plausible.
13Abraham, 1987, for a discussion of this dataset). The business cycle frequency correlation
between unemployment and the Help Wanted Index is about −0.9 and the two variables are
equally volatile (Abraham and Katz, 1986; Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; Shimer, 2005a).
In Section 6 I show that the model is consistent with this.
The fact that the level of the model-generated Beveridge curve ﬁts the JOLTS data
reﬂects how I chose the number of workers per labor market M. But the fact that the slope
and curvature of the model-generated Beveridge curve also ﬁts the data comes from the
structure of the model. The model cannot generate a diﬀerent Beveridge curve in response
to ﬂuctuations in productivity p. Indeed, aggregate ﬂuctuations in any parameter except M
would also aﬀect unemployment and vacancies only through the number of jobs per market
N and therefore would lead to the same comovement of unemployment and vacancies. In
other words, the shape of the Beveridge curve does not depend on the source of shocks.
In contrast, while the matching model is able to produce a negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, doing so is not trivial. For example, Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) report a theoretical correlation between unemployment and vacancies of −0.26. Merz
(1995) reports the correlation is −0.15 if search intensity is exogenous and 0.32 if it moves
endogenously over the business cycle. Shimer (2005a) ﬁnds that shocks to aggregate pro-
ductivity induce a strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies and a
judicious choice of the matching function yields the correct slope of the Beveridge curve as
well. But even then, adding realistic ﬂuctuations in the separation rate to the model induces
a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
5 Comparative Statics
This section performs comparative statics in a deterministic version of the model. In the
absence of aggregate shocks, λ = 0, the HJB equation (6) reduces to
(r + l)k = (p − z)S(N
∗
p). (10)
The user cost of capital must equal the proﬁt from having a job in a market with unemployed
workers times the share of markets with unemployed workers. Throughout this section, I
assume this equation holds at every point in time and examine the eﬀect of the level of
productivity on unemployment, vacancies, the job ﬁnding rate for unemployed workers, and
the separation rate into unemployment for employed workers. The results are useful because
they are simple but also accurately foreshadow the simulations of the stochastic model which
I report in Section 6.
145.1 Volatility of the v-u Ratio
I start by examining how a permanent productivity shock aﬀects the v-u ratio:
Proposition 5 The responsiveness of the v-u ratio to productivity is























Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (23) implies U′(N) = −S(N); since N − V (N) = M − U(N), V ′(N) = 1 −
S(N); and equation (18) provides the formula for S′(N) = −U′′(N). Thus we can compute
equation (11) analytically. The equation shows that the responsiveness of the v-u ratio
to a permanent productivity shock depends on the number of workers and jobs per labor
market and on
p
p−z but not on other details of the model. Let M = 244.2 and N = 236.3,
values consistent with the mean unemployment and vacancy rates in recent years. Then
equation (11) implies that a one percent increase in productivity will raise the v-u ratio
by 4.25
p
p−z. By contrast, Shimer (2005a, p. 36) argues that in a matching model with
wages determined by Nash bargaining, the elasticity of the v-u ratio with respect to labor
productivity is less than one-fourth as large, about 1.03
p
p−z, although the exact value depends
on some other parameters, especially workers’ bargaining power.
Why is the v-u ratio so much more responsive in the mismatch model than in a matching
model? Part of the reason has to do with the nature of job creation costs. Shimer (2005a)
assumes that ﬁrms must pay a ﬂow cost to maintain a vacancy, while here the cost is sunk.
This irreversibility is qualitatively important for the coexistence of unemployment and va-
cancies, since otherwise ﬁrms would close vacancies in labor markets without enough workers.
If I make vacancy creation irreversible in a simple matching model, the elasticity of the v-u
ratio with respect to labor productivity rises to 1.9
p
p−z.10 This explains almost half of the
diﬀerence between models.
The other half of the explanation is more intimately tied to the structure of mismatch.
10This is isomorphic to introducing a capital cost (r + s)k into the simple matching model, which
Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) argue signiﬁcantly raises the responsiveness of the v-u ratio. To be pre-
cise, I introduce a sunk cost of creating a job and set the ﬂow cost of a vacancy to zero. The elasticity of the
v-u ratio with respect to net labor productivity p − z is





(r + s)(1 − η(θ)) + βf(θ)
,
where r = 0.012 is the quarterly interest rate, s = 0.102 is the separation rate, β = 0.72 is worker’s bargaining
power, θ is the v-u ratio, f(θ) = 1.35 is workers’ job ﬁnding rate, and η(θ) = 0.28 is the elasticity of f, as
in Shimer (2005a). I also set θ = 0.412, consistent with a 5.4 percent unemployment rate and a 2.3 percent
vacancy rate. This gives an elasticity 1.90
p
p−z.
15For expositional simplicity, I focus in this paragraph on the case when home production
income, z, is zero. Shimer (2005a) argues that in the matching model, a one percent increase
in labor productivity leads to an almost one percent increase in wages in all jobs with little
change in proﬁtability and hence in job creation. In the mismatch model, a one percent
increase in labor productivity raises the wage by one percent in markets with vacancies but
does not aﬀect the wage in markets with unemployment, where it is ﬁxed at z. In addition,
some markets shift from having excess workers to having excess jobs, with an associated
large wage increase. The responsiveness of the number of jobs to productivity is determined
by this last channel. At the benchmark values of M and N, a one percent increase in the
number of jobs reduces the share of markets with vacancies by 6.5 percent. Equivalently, to
oﬀset a one percent increase in productivity in the mismatch model, we require roughly a
0.15 percent increase in the number of jobs, signiﬁcantly more than in the matching model.
Part of the greater volatility of the mismatch model therefore comes directly from its central
feature, the distinction between markets with unemployment and markets with vacancies.
5.2 Job Finding and Separation Rates
Next I examine the determinants of the transition rates from unemployment to employment,
the job ﬁnding rate, and from employment to unemployment, the separation rate. If an
employed worker quits her labor market, an unemployed worker may take her old job (an
unemployment-to-employment or UE transition) and she may fail to ﬁnd a job in her new
labor market (an employment-to-unemployment or EU transition). If an unemployed worker
quits his labor market, he may ﬁnd a job in his new labor market (UE transition). If a
ﬁlled job leaves the labor market, its old employee may be left jobless (EU transition). But
whenever a new job enters a labor market, it may hire a worker (UE transition). These
events may also lead an employed worker to switch employers.
Let ρUE
q (N) denote the probability that a quit leads to a UE transition. This occurs if
either the quitting worker is employed in a labor market with unemployed workers or if the
















The ﬁrst term is the fraction of workers who are employed in labor markets with unemployed
workers. This is equal to j workers in every labor market with i > j. The second term is
the product of the fraction of workers who are unemployed and the fraction of labor markets
with vacancies, j > i.









j=0 iπ(i,j;N) = 0.
Add this to the right hand side of equation (12) and simplify using equation (3):
ρ
UE






This is the product of the employment rate and the fraction of labor markets without va-
cancies. Equivalently, the probability a quit shock leads to an unemployed worker becoming
employed is the same as the probability it leads to an employed worker becoming unem-
ployed: ρUE
q (N) = ρEU
q (N). This result is sensible. Since the quit rate does not aﬀect the
unemployment rate, the probability that a quit shock leads to a UE transition must be the
same as the probability that it leads to an EU transition.
I similarly let ρUE
n (N) denote the probability that a job entering a labor market causes
a UE transition. This occurs whenever the job enters a market with unemployed workers,
so ρUE
n (N) = S(N). Conversely, the probability that a job leaving a market causes an EU


















The second equation uses the same logic as going from equation (12) to equation (13) while
the third equation reorders the sum to prove that ρEU
l (N) = ρUE
n (N) = S(N).
Putting these together, we get the instantaneous transition rate from unemployment to
employment in steady state, i.e. the job ﬁnding rate for unemployed workers:
f(N) =
qMρUE




There are qM quit shocks per labor market, each leading to a UE transition with probability
ρUE
q (N). Similarly, jobs enter to oﬀset exits, at rate lN, leading to a UE transition with
probability ρUE
n (N). This gives the total rate at which unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs in an
average labor market. Dividing by the total number of unemployed workers per labor market
gives the instantaneous job ﬁnding rate for unemployed workers.
We can similarly deﬁne the separation rate to unemployment as
s(N) =
qMρEU

























q = 0, l = 0.162
q = 0.081, l = 0.081
q = 0.162, l = 0
Figure 2: Comparative statics of f and V/U with respect to changes in N ∈ [233,243].
M = 244.2 throughout.
that a proportional increase in q and l causes a proportional increase in the job ﬁnding and
separation rates but does not aﬀect the curvature of either function. Finally, a q or l shock
that does not cause a separation must cause a job-to-job transition and so the job-to-job
transition rate is q + l − s(N).
I start by exploring the behavior of a “reduced-form matching function,” the comovement
of f(N) with the v-u ratio V (N)/U(N). Fix M = 244.2 and q = l = 0.081 (per quarter)
and let N vary between 233 and 243; if N = 236.3, the unemployment and vacancy rates are
5.4 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively, and the separation rate s(N) is 0.105 per quarter,
consistent with average values reported in Shimer (2005a). The solid blue line in Figure 2
shows the resulting relationship between the job ﬁnding rate f and the v-u ratio as N varies.
When jobs are plentiful, vacancies are high, unemployment is low, and unemployed workers
are likely to move rapidly into jobs. In addition, Figure 2 shows that the relationship is
insensitive to the composition of the total separation rate, s ≡ q + l, between quits and
layoﬀs. The dashed lines with q = 0.162 and l = 0 or with q = 0 and l = 0.162 are
distinguishable from the solid line. I conclude that the ratio of the job ﬁnding rate to q + l
essentially depends only on the number of workers and jobs per labor market.
A striking feature of the relationship between f and V/U in Figure 2 is that it is nearly
isoelastic. Fix q = l = 0.081 and let N vary between 233 and 243. As the v-u ratio falls, the
elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate with respect to the v-u ratio declines slightly from 0.211 to
0.202. If q = 0 and l = 0.162, the decline is even smaller, from 0.212 to 0.205.11 Although
this decrease indicates that the relationship is not exactly a Cobb-Douglas, if the model were
the data generating process, it would be virtually impossible to reject the hypothesis of a
11As M = N → ∞, the elasticity converges to 1
2 − 1






















q = 0, l = 0.162
q = 0.081, l = 0.081
q = 0.162, l = 0
Figure 3: Comparative statics of s and V/U with respect to changes in N ∈ [233,243].
M = 244.2 throughout.
Cobb-Douglas empirically.
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey a large literature that explores the behavior of
empirical matching functions. Most papers ﬁnd that the number of matches is a constant
returns to scale function of unemployment and vacancies, or equivalently that matches per
unemployed worker (the job ﬁnding rate) is a function of the v-u ratio. The literature also
typically cannot reject a Cobb-Douglas relationship between these variables. On page 393,
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) conclude that “a plausible range for the empirical elasticity”
of the job ﬁnding rate with respect to the v-u ratio is 0.3 to 0.5, while this model implies a
slightly lower elasticity, around 0.2. The aggregation of distinct labor markets may provide
an explanation for the empirical evidence on matching functions.
The model also implies that when productivity is higher, the separation rate is lower.
This is not because q or l shocks are less likely; by construction, the incidence of these shocks
is constant. Instead, when productivity is higher, there are more jobs per labor market
which implies that when an employed worker quits her labor market or loses her job, she is
more likely to immediately ﬁnd a new job. This suggests that the model will be able to ex-
plain some of the observed countercyclicality of the separation rate (Blanchard and Diamond,
1990). Conversely, the model also predicts that the job-to-job transition rate is procyclical,
qualitatively consistent with evidence in Fallick and Fleischman (2004).
6 Simulations of the Stochastic Model
I now move beyond comparative statics to explore the comovement of unemployment, va-
cancies, the job ﬁnding rate, the separation rate, and labor productivity. Table 1 shows the
19Summary Statistics, quarterly U.S. data, 1951 to 2003
U V V/U f s p
Standard Deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.075 0.020
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.733 0.878
U 1 −0.894 −0.971 −0.949 0.709 −0.408
V — 1 0.975 0.897 −0.684 0.364
V/U — — 1 0.948 −0.715 0.396
Correlation Matrix
f — — — 1 −0.574 0.396
s — — — — 1 −0.524
p — — — — — 1
Table 1: Seasonally adjusted unemployment u is constructed by the BLS from the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index v is
constructed by the Conference Board. The job ﬁnding rate f and separation rate s are
constructed from seasonally adjusted employment, unemployment, and short-term unem-
ployment, all computed by the BLS from the CPS. See Shimer (2005a) for details. u, v, f,
and s are quarterly averages of monthly series. Average labor productivity p is seasonally
adjusted real average output per person in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the National Income and Product Accounts and the
Current Employment Statistics. All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP
trend with smoothing parameter 105.
empirical behavior of these variables in the U.S. economy from 1951 to 2003. This simply
replicates Table 1 in Shimer (2005a); I refer the reader to that paper for details on the
construction of the variables.
6.1 Calibration Procedure
This model is parameterized by 9 numbers: the number of workers per labor market M, the
quit and layoﬀ rates q and l, the discount rate r, the value of leisure z, the cost of creating
a job k, and the three parameters of the stochastic process for productivity, the number of
steps ν, the arrival rate of shocks λ, and the step size ∆. I choose these parameters to match
certain facts and then explore the model’s behavior along other dimensions.
I ﬁx M = 244.2 to match the location of the Beveridge curve in Figure 1 and set q =
l = 0.081 to match the average quarterly separation rate in a deterministic steady state with
N = 236.3. The comparative statics suggest that the decomposition of q + l is unimportant
for the results and unreported results conﬁrm this.12 I set the quarterly interest rate to
r = 0.012. I let ν = 1000, λ = 86.6, and ∆ = 0.00580276. This implies a mean reversion
parameter of γ = 0.0866 and a standard deviation of σ = 0.054 for the latent variable
12This irrelevance result breaks down if l is extremely close to zero. In that case the number of jobs
decreases only very slowly, exacerbating the irreversibility of investment.
20y. I choose these values to match the standard deviation and autocorrelation of detrended
productivity, the ﬁrst two numbers in the last column of Table 1. If I change ν, λ, and ∆
without altering γ and σ, the results are again scarcely aﬀected. I set the value of home
production at z = 0.4 for comparability with Shimer (2005a); like in a matching model, this
parameter is critical for the volatility of all the variables (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2005).13
Finally, I ﬁx k = 4.07848 so that in the deterministic steady state with p = 1, there are
indeed 236.3 jobs per labor market.
To characterize the equilibrium, I ﬁrst compute the targets N∗
p for each of the 2ν + 1
states following the procedure in the proof of Proposition 1. I then choose an initial value for
p(0) and N(0) and select the timing of the ﬁrst shock t, an exponentially-distributed random
variable with mean 1/λ. I compute the number of unemployed workers who ﬁnds jobs and
the number of employed workers who lose jobs during the interval [0,t]. These are slightly
more complicated than in steady state because if N(0) > N∗
p(0), there are time intervals when
no new jobs are created. Similarly, if N(0) < N∗
p(0), N∗
p(0) − N(0) jobs immediately enter
and U(N(0)) − U(N∗
p(0)) workers ﬁnd work. I next compute the number of jobs at time t: if
N(0) ≤ eltN∗
p(0), N(t) = N∗
p(0); otherwise, N(t) = e−ltN(0) as the number of jobs decays with
exits. Finally, I choose the next value of p(t) as described in Section 3.4 and repeat.
At the end of each month (1/3 of a period), I record unemployment, vacancies, cumulative
matches and separations, and productivity. I measure the job ﬁnding rate f for unemployed
workers as the ratio of the number of matches during a month to the number of unemployed
workers at the start of the month. I similarly measure the separation rate s as the number
of separations divided by the number of employed workers at the start of the month. I throw
away the ﬁrst 25,000 years of data to remove the eﬀect of initial conditions. Every subsequent
53 years of model-generated data gives one sample. I take quarterly averages of monthly data
and express all variables as log deviation from an HP ﬁlter with parameter 105, the same low
frequency ﬁlter that I use on U.S. data. I create 20,000 samples and report model moments
and the cross-sample standard deviation of those moments.
6.2 Results
Table 2 summarizes the model generated data. The last column shows the driving force, labor
productivity. By construction, I match the standard deviation and quarterly autocorrelation
in U.S. data. The remaining numbers are driven by the structure of the model.
The ﬁrst two columns show unemployment and vacancies. As I stressed in Section 4,
13In the deterministic steady state with N = 236.3, about 64.7 percent of employed workers are in markets
with j ≤ i and hence are paid z. This implies the labor share is 0.647·0.4+0.353·1 = 0.61, a bit lower than
the usual value of 2/3.
21Model Generated Data (and standard errors)






















































s — — — — 1 −0.995
(0.001)
p — — — — — 1
Table 2: Results from simulations of the benchmark model. See the text for details.
both of these variables only depend on the contemporaneous number of jobs. Thus the
model generates a nearly-perfect negative correlation between them, stronger than the em-
pirical correlation of −0.89. The model also explains 42 percent of the observed volatility
in vacancies and 31 percent of the observed volatility in unemployment. The theoretical
autocorrelations of the two variables are about equal, consistent with the empirical evidence.
This last observation is notable since the equal persistence of unemployment and vacancies
is a puzzle for matching models where unemployment is a state variable and vacancies are a
jump variable (Shimer, 2005a; Fujita, 2003; Fujita and Ramey, 2005).
The third column shows that volatility of the v-u ratio is 7.03 times as large as the volatil-
ity of labor productivity. Recall that Proposition 5 suggested that a one percent increase in
labor productivity would raise the v-u ratio by 4.25
p
p−z. Evaluating at p = 1 and z = 0.4, the
predicted elasticity was 7.08, indistinguishable from the results in the full stochastic model.
The fourth column shows that the model produces 26 percent of the observed volatility
in the job ﬁnding rate. The correlation between the detrended job ﬁnding rate and the
detrended v-u ratio is 0.93, only slightly lower than the 0.95 in the data. I also estimate
a Cobb-Douglas reduced-form matching function in the data, regressing the detrended job
ﬁnding rate on the detrended v-u ratio in each 212 quarter sample. The resulting elasticity
estimate averages 0.202 (standard error 0.005). When I add a quadratic term in the v-u ratio
to test for a constant elasticity, I reject the null at the ﬁve percent level about 1.2 percent of
the time. These ﬁndings are all consistent with the comparative statics shown in Figure 2.
The ﬁfth column shows that the model generates 43 percent of the observed volatility in
22the separation rate into unemployment even though both q and l are constant. The ﬂip side
of this is that the model produces a strongly procyclical job-to-job transition rate, consistent
with the facts reported in Fallick and Fleischman (2004).14
Because the model has only one shock, most of the correlations are close to one in absolute
value. Moreover, a one shock model probably should not be able to explain all the volatility
in vacancies and unemployment; there must be other shocks in the data, e.g. to the cost
of investment goods k (Fisher, 2006). Hall (2005), Mortensen and Nagypal (2005), and
Rudanko (2005) propose evaluating one shock models by examining the standard deviation
of the projection of the detrended v-u ratio on detrended productivity. By this metric, the
projection in the data is 0.151 and in the model it is barely smaller, 0.143. Similarly, the
target for the separation rate should be just 0.039, compared to 0.032 in the model. By this
metric, the mismatch model explains almost all of the volatility in these variables.
7 Duration Dependence
A distinctive feature of the mismatch model is that not all unemployed workers are equally
likely to ﬁnd a job. Even in steady state, the job ﬁnding rate for any particular unemployed
worker may diﬀer substantially from the average job ﬁnding rate in equation (15), since it
depends on the number of workers i and the number of jobs j in her labor market. This gives
rise to duration dependence in the job ﬁnding rate: if an econometrician observes a worker
who has been unemployed for a long time but cannot observe local labor market conditions,
he should infer that the worker is probably in a labor market in which jobs are scarce and
workers plentiful. The worker’s job ﬁnding rate is correspondingly low. Conversely, a newly
unemployed worker’s job ﬁnding rate is higher than the average job ﬁnding rate f.
In addition to being empirically relevant, duration dependence aﬀects the reduced-form
matching function depicted in Figure 2. At the start of the month, the average unemployed
worker ﬁnds a job at rate f; however, conditional on staying unemployed, that worker’s job
ﬁnding probability falls by the end of the month. Equivalently, the full month probability of
ﬁnding a job is less than 1−e−f, the probability of ﬁnding (at least) one job during a month if
jobs arrive at a Poisson rate f. Since empirically I measure the fraction of unemployed workers
who ﬁnd a job during a month, this could represent an important distinction between the
model and data. This section therefore also explores the implications of duration dependence
for the measured job ﬁnding probability.
14I do not report the job-to-job transition rate here because Fallick and Fleischman’s (2004) series is only
available since 1994, a relatively tranquil period. A previous version of the paper showed that the model
slightly underpredicts the number of job-to-job transitions.
237.1 Cross Section
I start by examining duration dependence in unemployment rates in a deterministic steady
state. I simulate 200 million unemployment spells to recover the full month job ﬁnding
probabilities numerically. In half the spells, I start with a “job leaver,” a worker who quit
her labor market and moved to one in which there were more workers than jobs, i > j. In
the other half of the spells, I start with a “job loser,” a worker whose job left a labor market
that previously had i workers and j ≤ i jobs. In both cases, I simulate the evolution of the
worker’s local labor market, stochastic changes in the number of workers and jobs coming
from entry and exit, until the worker ﬁnds a job either because a new job enters, an employed
worker leaves, or our unemployed worker quits for a labor market with vacancies.
I assume that whenever a job is available, each unemployed worker is equally likely to be
hired, independent of unemployment duration. For example, if at some point our unemployed
worker is in a labor market with i workers and j < i jobs and a new job enters, I assume
that she gets the job with probability 1/(i − j).15
I use the usual value for the number of workers per labor market, M = 244.2. I set the
quit and layoﬀ rates at q = l = 0.027 and think of a time period as a month rather than a
quarter. For now I ﬁx N = 236.3, giving an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent. With these
values, the instantaneous job ﬁnding rate, f in equation (15), is 61.0 percent. If the job
ﬁnding rate were constant during a month, the full month probability of ﬁnding at least one
job would be 1 − e−f = 45.6 percent. Figure 4 shows the theoretical monthly probability of
ﬁnding a job—the fraction of workers who ﬁnd a job during the next month—as a function
of the current duration of an unemployment spell and the reason for unemployment. The
job ﬁnding probability for job losers is slightly higher than for job leavers, reﬂecting slight
diﬀerences in initial conditions for the two groups.
I next compute the average job ﬁnding probability for an unemployed worker, a weighted
average of the job ﬁnding probability in Figure 4, with weights corresponding to the fraction
of spells that do not end before a particular duration. 39.8 percent of job leavers and 40.2











t is the job ﬁnding probability for worker i, Ut is the number of unemployed in month
15The results in this section are sensitive to this assumption. If the most recently unemployed worker is
always the ﬁrst to get a job, the model generates signiﬁcantly more duration dependence in the exit rate
from unemployment. Conversely, if the unemployed queue for a job (Sattinger, 2005), duration dependence is
inverted, with the long-term unemployed more likely to ﬁnd a job than the short-term unemployed. Another
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Figure 4: Monthly job ﬁnding probability as a function of unemployment duration. The
number of workers per labor market is M = 244.2, the number of jobs per labor market is
N = 236.3. The quit and layoﬀ rates are q = l = 0.027 per month.
t, and Us
t is the number of short-term unemployed, workers unemployed 0 to 4 weeks; see
Shimer (2005b) for details. Since December 2000, this has averaged 39.7 percent. The model
matches this number because of my choice of q = l = 0.027 and is scarcely aﬀected by changes
in q and l leaving q + l constant.
Figure 4 shows that the job ﬁnding probability of both job losers and job leavers declines
sharply during an unemployment spell. I summarize this decline in a single number by
looking at a weighted average of the job ﬁnding probability, where weights correspond to
unemployment duration. Shimer (2005b) shows that I can measure this empirically using












t is worker i’s unemployment duration. This averaged 24.3 percent in the U.S. since
December 2000, while in the model it is 33.0 percent for job leavers and 33.2 percent for job
losers. In other words, the model explains a good fraction of observed duration dependence.
Presumably the rest is due to unmodeled heterogeneity among workers within labor markets.
7.2 Comparative Statics
I now explore how time aggregation and duration dependence aﬀect the theoretical relation-
ship between the job ﬁnding rate and the v-u ratio. I let N vary from 233 to 243 with M, q,
and l ﬁxed. At each value of N I compute the v-u ratio and simulate the fraction of unem-
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Figure 5: Theoretical monthly job ﬁnding probability as a function of the v-u ratio. The
number of workers per labor market is ﬁxed at M = 244.2 and the quit and layoﬀ rates at
q = l = 0.027. The entry rate of jobs varies so N takes values between 233 to 243.
the results. There is again an increasing relationship between the v-u ratio and the measured
job ﬁnding probability. The solid blue line depicts a Cobb-Douglas function through these
points. Again the ﬁt is remarkable, although the elasticity is lower than before, just 0.13.
The hollow green circles in Figure 5 show the relationship between the v-u ratio and
1 − e−f(N), where f(N) is deﬁned in equation (15). This is a full month measure of the
job ﬁnding probability but ignores duration dependence. This is systematically about 15
percent higher than F(N) but the quality of the Cobb-Douglas ﬁt (dashed green line) and
the elasticity (0.15) are similar. I conclude that accounting for time aggregation lowers the
level of the theoretical job ﬁnding probability but does not aﬀect the main conclusion that
the model generates a Cobb-Douglas reduced-form matching function.
8 Mobility
In this section, I take a step towards relaxing the assumption that all workers and all jobs are
equally likely to leave their labor market. I focus throughout on steady states. Rather than
model such mobility costs explicitly, I consider an ad hoc structure that suggests how mobility
costs might aﬀect my results. Recall that a worker’s payoﬀ is monotonically increasing in the
number of jobs in her labor market and monotonically decreasing in the number of workers.
Thus the workers who are most motivated to quit their labor market are those where i−j is
largest. Conversely, jobs are most proﬁtable in those labor markets. With an explicit cost of
job mobility, workers will use a cutoﬀ rule to decide when to exit a labor market. Conversely,
they may choose never to exit a labor market where i−j is suﬃciently small. Firms behavior
26is likely to be similar.
I capture this with a new parameter, δ ∈ {1,2,...}, and assume that in every labor
market, the diﬀerence between the number of workers i and the number of jobs j is bounded
by δ, so |i−j| ≤ δ. In a market with |i−j| < δ, each worker quits at rate q, each job leaves
at rate l, new workers enter at rate m, and new jobs enter at rate n. But jobs never leave
and workers never enter a market with i−j = δ, although the exit rate of workers and entry
rate of jobs are unchanged. Similarly, workers never leave and jobs never enter a market with
j − i = δ. The benchmark model corresponds to δ → ∞, where m = qM and n = lN.
The primitives are the average number of workers and jobs per labor market, M and N,
and the quit and layoﬀ rates, q and l. I determine the inﬂow rates m and n endogenously. It
is straightforward to show that the distribution of workers and jobs across labor markets is




if |i − j| ≤ δ, (17)
and πδ(i,j) = 0 otherwise, where the constant ¯ π ensures that this is a proper density and
I suppress the dependence of the density on N. To verify equation (17), note that if −δ ≤
i − j < δ, the rate at which labor markets switch from state (i,j) to (i + 1,j) and the rate
at which they switch back are equal:
mπδ(i,j) = q(i + 1)πδ(i + 1,j),
and similarly for other transition rates.
The inﬂow rates m and n must ensure that we have the correct number of workers and












An increase in the number of jobs per labor market N, for example, raises the inﬂow rate of
jobs n and reduces the inﬂow rate of workers m. Intuitively, there are fewer labor markets
where jobs can settle, with j − i < δ, and more labor markets where jobs can exit, with
i − j < δ. Therefore the rate at which jobs leave is higher and the few labor markets that
can absorb new jobs get them faster. The logic for how N aﬀects m is similar.
I next examine how the Beveridge curve depends on δ. When δ = 1, we require M = 8.953
workers and N = 8.663 jobs to deliver the same unemployment and vacancy rates as in































Figure 6: Model-generated Beveridge curve with diﬀerent values of δ.
frictions and so implies that we need small labor markets to explain the average level of
unemployment and vacancies. As N varies between about 8.47 and 8.94, with M, q, and l
ﬁxed, we trace out a downward-sloping Beveridge curve. I show this in Figure 6 as a dash-dot
purple line. At higher values of δ, the model-generated Beveridge curve is ﬂatter. At δ = 20
and M = 121.2, we get the dashed green line. With δ = 50 and M = 222.3, the Beveridge
curve is indistinguishable from the solid blue line, which represents the benchmark model.
There are two ways to interpret Figure 6. On the one hand, the Beveridge curve is quite
insensitive to the choice of δ and so seems to be a robust aggregation phenomenon. On the
other hand, the ﬁt of the model to the JOLTS data shown in Figure 1 is better when δ is
larger. The root mean squared error in the vacancy rate falls from 0.14 percentage points
when δ = 1, to 0.11 when δ = 20, to 0.09 when δ is inﬁnite. The ﬁt is always good, but it is
better when mobility is less directed.
I can also examine the reduced-form matching function in this version of the model. The
basic idea of how unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs is unchanged. They can move to a labor
market with jobs, wait for an employed worker to exit their labor market, or wait for a job to
enter. For each value of δ, I ﬁx q+l at a level which ensures a common job ﬁnding rate across
models when the unemployment rate is 5.4 percent and the vacancy rate is 2.3 percent. I
then vary the number of jobs N and compute the v-u ratio and the job ﬁnding rate.
Figure 7 shows the results. Again, the basic shape of the reduced-form matching function
is similar across models. When δ = 1, the average elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate with
respect to the v-u ratio is about 0.23, a better ﬁt than with δ = ∞, although the function

























Figure 7: Model-generated reduced-form matching function with diﬀerent values of δ
the function is closer to a Cobb-Douglas. At δ = 20, for example, the elasticity is around
0.17. For still higher values of δ, the elasticity increases again, converging to 0.21 in the
limit. Again, there are two ways to interpret these ﬁndings. Figure 7 shows that the results
are qualitatively insensitive to the value of δ, but some of the desirable model properties, in
particular the constant elasticity reduced-form matching function, depend on δ being large.
9 Conclusions
This paper develops a mismatch model of unemployment, vacancies, and labor market tran-
sitions. It provides a coherent framework for exploring a variety of facts, including the
comovement of unemployment, vacancies, the job ﬁnding rate, the separation rate, and the
job-to-job transition rate. The model is deliberately simple and mechanical in order to high-
light the major forces in a model of mismatch and stress that the ﬁndings are a consequence
of aggregation. They are robust to the exact pattern of mismatch across markets and so I
can allow workers to stay away from depressed labor markets without substantially aﬀecting
the conclusions. It therefore seems likely that aggregating other models of mismatch, e.g. the
stock-ﬂow matching model or the queuing model, would yield similar results. Preliminary
results in Shimer (2006) conﬁrm this hypothesis.
The matching model (Pissarides, 1985) is an important alternative explanation for these
facts. It seems plausible that mismatch and search frictions are complementary to each other
and both empirically relevant; however, there are some important diﬀerences between the
two frameworks. While the matching model can deliver a Beveridge curve with the right
slope, the mismatch model must deliver such a Beveridge curve. Moreover, the Beveridge
29curve in the mismatch model is unaﬀected by cyclical ﬂuctuations in the separation rate.
Indeed, mismatch provides a natural explanation for countercyclicality in the separation rate
and procyclicality in the job-to-job transition rate: when an employment relationship ends,
it is easier for a worker to move immediately into a new job when jobs are more plentiful.
I ﬁnd that small productivity shocks can explain much of the observed cyclicality in these
variables. Similarly, the mismatch model explains much of the volatility in vacancies and
unemployment and suggests why the two variables have similar persistence. It also predicts
that the job ﬁnding rate should decline with unemployment duration even if workers are
homogeneous, generating a good fraction of the observed duration dependence. All of these
ﬁndings are problematic in the matching model.
I also found that the mismatch model generates a systematic relationship between the
job ﬁnding rate and the v-u ratio. It predicts that a one percent increase in the v-u ratio
should raise the job ﬁnding rate by about 0.2 percent, about two-thirds of the empirically
relevant value. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst theoretical explanation for the empirical
relationship between these variables. In contrast, whether the matching function is Cobb-
Douglas is exogenous in the matching model. However, given all the diﬀerences discussed in
the previous paragraph, the mismatch model does not provide a microfoundation for writing
down an aggregate matching function.
At a microeconomic level, some of the model’s predictions are stark. For example, at
any point in time, two wages are paid, p(t) to workers in markets with vacancies and z to
all other workers. A small change in labor market conditions can cause a dramatic change
in wages. Note, however, that the continual reallocation of workers and jobs across labor
markets means that the expected value of a worker varies smoothly with the number of
workers and jobs in her labor market. If workers were risk averse and workers and ﬁrms
could commit to long term contracts, ﬁrms would insure workers against sharp ﬂuctuations
in labor market conditions, making wages a much smoother function of the state.
Heterogeneity of workers within a market leads to a similar result. Suppose workers diﬀer
in their productivity x, where a type x worker produces xp(t) units of output when employed
at time t. If there are excess workers in a market, competition within the labor market
ensures that the least productive workers are unemployed, the marginal employed worker
receives her value of leisure z, and the remaining workers are paid the diﬀerence between their
productivity and the productivity of the marginal worker, so ﬁrms are indiﬀerent about whom
to hire among the employed workers. The entry of an additional job increases employment by
one, thereby reducing the productivity of the marginal worker. For ﬁrms to remain indiﬀerent
about whom to hire, all workers must get a small wage increase, so wages respond smoothly
to local labor market conditions. This extension yields some other rich predictions. For
30example, wage cuts help to forecast future job loss since they imply that a worker is falling
closer to being the marginal worker in her labor market.
There are other predictions of the mismatch model that I have not explored here. For
example, the mismatch model predicts procyclical real wages since more workers are in la-
bor markets with excess jobs during booms. It likewise predicts a stable link between local
unemployment rates and wages, Blanchﬂower and Oswald’s (1995) “wage curve.” The mis-
match model also provides a coherent theory of jobs and hence a model of job ﬂows distinct
from worker ﬂows. In principle this means that the model could simultaneously be used
to address facts about labor market ﬂows and facts about job creation and job destruction
(Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996). Preliminary work suggests that a simple feature of
the labor market, the fact that the vacancy rate is less than the unemployment rate, may
explain why job ﬂows are systematically smaller than workers ﬂows: it is easier to ﬁnd a
worker than to ﬁnd a job.
A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. I start by constructing the unique equilibrium with increasing
thresholds. The last paragraph proves that there is no other equilibrium. Start with the
smallest value p = p−ν∆ with associated target N∗
p−ν∆. Following an aggregate shock, pro-
ductivity increases by one step with certainty and so the target number of job increases to
N∗
p−(ν−1)∆ > N∗
p−ν∆. If N = N∗
p−ν∆, the value of a job is k both before and after the shock,
Jp−ν∆(N∗
p−ν∆) = Jp−(ν−1)∆(N∗
p−ν∆) = k. In other words, evaluating equation (6) at p = p−ν∆
and N = N∗
p−ν∆ and using the smooth pasting condition in equation (7) gives
rk = (p−ν∆ − z)S(N
∗
p−ν∆) − lk.
This uniquely deﬁnes N∗















π(i,i − 1;N). (18)
The ﬁrst equality uses Lemma 1 and the second eliminates common terms.
I now proceed by induction. Suppose that for some y > −ν∆, y ∈ Y , I have shown that
the targets N∗
py′ are increasing and I have computed Jpy′(N∗
py−∆) for all y′ < y, y′ ∈ Y . For
31N ∈ [N∗
py−∆,N∗
py] and y′ < y, equation (6) implies


























In addition, Jpy(N) = k for N ∈ [N∗
py−∆,N∗
py]. This is a system of ν + y/∆ diﬀerential
equations in N with the same number of terminal conditions from the previous induction
steps and so we can compute Jpy′(N), N ∈ [N∗
py−∆,N∗
py] for all y′ < y, y′ ∈ Y . The only catch
is that we do not yet know N∗
py. To compute it, evaluate equation (6) at py and N = N∗
py
and simplify with equation (7):
rk = (py − z)S(N
∗













where I use Jpy+∆(N∗
py) = k to eliminate the term coming from a positive shock. This uniquely
deﬁnes N∗
py since both S and Jpy−∆ are decreasing.





py) = (r + l)k < (py−∆ − z)S(N
∗
py−∆). (21)
The equality uses Jpy−∆(N∗
py) = k whenever N∗
py ≤ N∗
py−∆. The inequality uses equation (19)
evaluated at y′ = y − ∆ and N = N∗
py−∆, but drops the capital gain terms; those are all
negative-valued since N∗
py ≤ N∗
py−∆ (by assumption in this paragraph) and N∗
py−2∆ < N∗
py−∆






Finally, suppose there were an equilibrium with N∗
py ≤ N∗
py−∆ for some y ∈ Y . Focus on
the largest such y, so either N∗
py < N∗
py+∆ or y = ν∆, in which case productivity can only
decline from py. Analogous to the reasoning behind equation (21), we ﬁnd
(py − z)S(N
∗
py) = (r + l)k ≤ (py−∆ − z)S(N
∗
py−∆),
since a productivity shock when p = py and N = N∗
py does not aﬀect the value of a job (the
threshold goes up), while a productivity shock when p = py−∆ and N = N∗
py−∆ may reduce
the value of a job. The inequalities imply N∗
py > N∗
py−∆, a contradiction.











Here g is the gross increase in the number of jobs per labor market and U(N) is the number of
unemployed workers per labor market, given by equation (3). The ﬂow value of the planner,
rWp(N), can be divided into three terms. First is current net output, p for each of the
M − U(N) employed workers, z for each of the U(N) unemployed workers, and −k for each
job created. Second is the future increases in in Wp(N) coming from any net increase in the
number of jobs, the diﬀerence between gross job creation and deprecation, g−lN. Third is the
possibility of an aggregate shock, with arrival rate λ, at which point the planner anticipates

















(i − j)π(i,j;N) = −S(N). (23)
The ﬁrst equation follows from Lemma 1, while the the second eliminates common terms
from the double sum. Use this to write the envelope condition from equation (22) as
rW
′













The ﬁrst order condition for the gross amount of job creation conditional on the current state
(p,N) is
gp(N) ≥ 0, W
′
p(N) ≤ k, and gp(N)(W
′
p(N) − k) = 0.
Substituting this into equation (24) gives expressions analogous to equations (6) and (7) with
W ′
p(N) = Jp(N).




































The ﬁrst equality uses the deﬁnition of π(i,j;N) in equation (1), the second equality rein-





j=0 π(i,j;N), with proof analogous to




























Substitute this into the previous equation to get ∂u/∂ logM in equation (8).
To compute the response of u to N, plug equation (23) into ∂u






get the desired result. The partial derivatives of v are computed symmetrically.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the locus of pairs (M,N) that deliver a particular
unemployment rate u0. Equation (8) implies that this locus satisﬁes
∂ logN
∂ logM












That is, if (M1,N1) and (M2,N2) with M1 < M2 both yield the same unemployment rate u0,


















so if (M1,N1) and (M2,N2) with M1 < M2 both yield the same vacancy rate v0, M2/M1 <
N2/N1. This proves that there is at most one pair (M,N) associated with each pair (u,v).
The proof of existence is standard.
Proof of Proposition 5. The chain rule implies





































∂ logp . To see that this is positive, note that U(N) and V (N) are
positive. Since the share of markets with unemployed workers S(N) ∈ (0,1), U′(N) < 0.
Also since V (N) = N − M + U(N), V ′(N) = 1 − S(N) > 0. Finally, equation (18) implies
U′′(N) = −S′(N) > 0. Combining inequalities yields the result.
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